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Have de-industrialization, expanding services and occupational upgrading put an end to class divisions? Drawing on extensive empirical research, this book adds new insights to the debate about the end of class and shows that Western European societies remain decidedly stratified with respect to material advantages and citizenship rights. Well grounded in theory, it offers a highly original account of today's social stratification and presents novel findings about working conditions, political preferences and pension coverage of different classes in contemporary Britain, Germany, Sweden and Swi

A popular thesis in social stratification argues that the middle class is declining. Our chapter argues that this thesis is flawed both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, it mixes up the middle and working class and, empirically, misrepresents the trends that shape the class structure. Our chapter discusses the main concepts of class and proposes a model that grasps the class structure of contemporary Western societies. Based on clearer concepts, labour force surveys clearly show that the early 21st century did not see the demise, but the expansion of the (salaried) middle class. Never in history had so many people been working in managerial, professional and technical jobs. By contrast, over the last four decades, the working class experienced a massive employment decline – and this decline had far-reaching consequences. It has vastly reduced its political clout as shown in decreasing trade union density and strike activity as well as in rising income inequality. Moreover, it has led to a fundamental realignment of class voting and contributed to growing family instability. Rather than eroding the middle class, the last decades have put an end to the working-class century.

Welfare states are often reduced to their role as providers of social protection and redistribution. In 1990, Esping-Andersen argued that they also affect employment creation and the class structure. We analyse the stratification outcomes for three welfare regimes – Britain, Germany and Denmark – over the 1990s and 2000s. Based on individual-level surveys, we observe a disproportionate increase among professionals and managers, and a decline among production workers and clerks. The result is clear-cut occupational upgrading in Denmark and Germany. In Britain, high and low-end service jobs expanded, resulting in a polarized version of upgrading. Growth in low-end service jobs – and thus polarization – is no precondition for full employment. Both Britain and Denmark halved their low-educated unemployment rate between 1995 and 2008. Yet low-end service jobs expanded only in Britain, not in Denmark. The cause is the evolution of labour supply: rising educational attainment means that fewer low-educated workers look for low-skilled jobs.

This chapter argues that the electoral competition between the New Left and the Radical Right is best understood as a cultural divide anchored in different class constituencies. Based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we analyze the links between voters' class position, their economic and cultural preferences and their party choice for four small and affluent European countries. We find a striking similarity in the class pattern across countries. Everywhere, the New Left attracts disproportionate support from socio-cultural professionals and presents a clear-cut middle-class profile, whereas the Radical Right is most successful among production and service workers and receives least support from professionals. In general, the Radical Right depends on the votes of lowereducated men and older citizens and has turned into a new type of working-class party. However, its success within the working-class is not due to economic, but to cultural issues. The voters of the Radical Right collide with those of the New Left over a cultural conflict of identity and community - and not over questions of redistribution. A full-grown cleavage has thus emerged in the four countries under study, separating a libertarian-universalistic pole from an authoritarian-communitarian pole and going along with a process of class realignment.

This chapter argues that the electoral competition between the New Left and the Radical Right is best understood as a cultural divide anchored in different class constituencies. Based on individual-level data from the European Social Survey, we analyze the links between voters' class position, their economic and cultural preferences and their party choice for four small and affluent European countries. We find a striking similarity in the class pattern across countries. Everywhere, the New Left attracts disproportionate support from socio-cultural professionals and presents a clear-cut middle-class profile, whereas the Radical Right is most successful among production and service workers and receives least support from professionals. In general, the Radical Right depends on the votes of lowereducated men and older citizens and has turned into a new type of working-class party. However, its success within the working-class is not due to economic, but to cultural issues. The voters of the Radical Right collide with those of the New Left over a cultural conflict of identity and community – and not over questions of redistribution. A full-grown cleavage has thus emerged in the four countries under study, separating a libertarianuniversalistic pole from an authoritarian-communitarian pole and going along with a process of class realignment.

After decades of stability, Switzerland's unions entered a period of turbulence in the early 1990s: their status as junior partner in the corporatist growth pact was challenged by the economic crisis, business organizations' neoliberal turn and an abrupt decline in membership. These challenges put unions under pressure to initiate revitalization efforts. They first responded by investing more resources into political action, using direct democratic instruments to block neoliberal reforms. In parallel, they adopted new means of recruitment, affiliating white-collar unions, targeting private services and resorting more frequently to strikes. Finally, they rationalized their organizational structure through a series of union mergers.

After decades of stability, Switzerland's unions entered a period of turbulence in the early 1990s: their status as junior partner in the corporatist growth pact was challenged by the economic crisis, business organizations' neoliberal turn and an abrupt decline in membership. These challenges put unions under pressure to initiate revitalization efforts. They first responded by investing more resources into political action, using direct democratic instruments to block neoliberal reforms. In parallel, they adopted new means of recruitment, affiliating white-collar unions, targeting private services and resorting more frequently to strikes. Finally, they rationalized their organizational structure through a series of union mergers.

During the 1990s, the working class has become the core clientele of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. This article empirically examines the motives of workers for supporting a right-wing populist party. Based on data from the European Social Survey for Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland, three different sets of explanations are tested: (1) hypotheses stressing economic determinants, that is, the fear of wage pressure and competition over welfare benefits; (2) hypotheses emphasizing cultural determinants, that is, the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity; and (3) hypotheses focusing on social alienation, that is, dissatisfaction with the way the country's democracy works and the nonintegration into intermediary networks (trade unions). We find questions of community and identity to be clearly more important than economic grievances. Hence, in Austria and Switzerland, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties among workers seems primarily due to cultural protectionism: the defense of national identity against outsiders. In Belgium, France, and Norway, cultural protectionism is complemented by deep-seated discontent with the way the countries' democracies work.

Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die These, wonach sich die industriellen Beziehungen in der Schweiz weg vom koordinierten rheinischen hin zum marktorientierten angelsächsischen Modell bewegten. Die Koordination zwischen Arbeitgeberverbänden und Gewerkschaften wird erstens im Bereich der kollektiven Arbeitsbeziehungen sowie zweitens in der Politikgestaltung untersucht. In einem dritten Schritt wird die Entwicklung der Repräsentationsmacht der Verbände seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre diskutiert. Nur wenig spricht dafür, dass sich die Schweiz vom Koordinationsmodell bewegt: Dezentralisierung und Individualisierung der Lohnpolitik haben zwar zu weniger Koordination geführt. Im Rahmen der Personenfreizügigkeit haben Gesamtarbeitsverträge jedoch stark an Bedeutung gewonnen. Die Verbände sind zudem weiterhin in den meisten ausserparlamentarischen Regulierungsinstanzen vertreten und spielen in der Wirtschaftspolitik die Rolle des Vetoplayer.